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SUMMARY 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. KURTH 
RANCH: THE EXPANSION OF DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE INTO CIVIL 
TAX PROCEEDINGS 
From the beginning of our government, the 
courts have sustained taxes although imposed 
with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior 
ends which, considered apart, were beyond the 
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize 
by legislation directly addressed to their accom-
plishment. l 
[T]he decisional law in the [double jeopardy] 
area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not 
fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navi-
gator. 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before its decision in Department of Revenue v. Kurth 
1. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950) (upholding the Marihuana 
Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2590(a)(2), now repealed (last codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741 
(1964», which imposed a federal tax on marijuana at the rate of $100-per-ounce, 
against a constitutional challenge that the tax was a penalty, rather than a true 
tax) (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934) (upholding against 
a due process challenge a steep excise tax imposed by the State of Washington on 
processors of oleomargarine during the Great Depression». . 
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Ranch,S the United States Supreme Court had never subjected 
a tax statute to double jeopardy scrutiny.4 In Kurth Ranch, 
the Supreme Court held that Montana's tax on the possession 
of illegal drugs, assessed after the state had imposed a crimi-
nal penalty for the same conduct, violated the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibition against successive punishments for the same 
offense.s The Court stated that the Montana Dangerous Drug 
Tax6 was not the kind of civil sanction that may follow the 
first punishment of a criminal offense.7 Moreover, the Court 
held that the civil proceeding Montana initiated to collect the 
tax was the "functional equivalent of a successive criminal 
prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time" 
for the same offense. s 
This summary first provides a brief overview of the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.9 The overview will be 
followed by an analysis of the Supreme Court's expansion of 
double jeopardy application in United States v. Halper. lo The 
3. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (per 
Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.; dissenting 
opinions by Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, J.; and Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.). 
4. See id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1945·46 & 
n.16. The Kurth Ranch Court explained: 
Id. 
Although we have never held that a tax violated the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause, we have assumed that one might. In 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), for example, 
this Court considered a Revenue Act provision requiring 
the taxpayer to pay an additional 50 percent of the total 
amount of any deficiency due to fraud with an intent to 
evade the tax. The Court assumed such a penalty could 
trigger double jeopardy protection if it were intended for 
punishment, but it nevertheless held that the statute was 
constitutional because the 50 percent addition to the tax 
was remedial, not punitive. Id., at 398-405. Although the 
penalty at issue in Mitchell is arguably better character-
ized as a sanction for fraud than a tax, the Court . . . 
[made) nothing of the potential import of the distinction. 
5. Id. at 1948. 
6. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987». The Kurth Ranch Court's opinion 
refers only to the 1987 edition of the Montana Code, the version in effect at the 
time of the Kurths' arrest. 
7. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. 
8. Id. 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
10. 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding for the first time that a civil fine constitutes 
2
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summary will then briefly analyze Montana's Dangerous Drug 
Tax Act. ll Finally, the summary will discuss the majority's 
reasoning in Kurth Ranch, and examine the three separate 
dissenting opinions. 12 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The extended Kurth family owned a ranch in Central 
Montana. 13 The Kurths' business involved livestock, mixed 
grain, and marijuana.14 Their family business grew into the 
largest known marijuana farming operation in the State of 
Montana.15 In October 1987, Montana law enforcement offi-
cers raided the ranch, arrested the Kurths, and confiscated 
2,155 marijuana plants, 1,811 ounces of harvested marijuana, 
hash tar and hash oil, equipment, and paraphernalia.16 The 
Kurths were convicted and sentenced on various state drug 
charges. 17 
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act imposes a tax "on the 
possession and storage of dangerous drugs" on each individual 
arrested for such possession and storage.18 In the case of mar-
punishment violative of the double jeopardy clause). 
11. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 §§ 15-25-101 to 
-123. 
12. Kurth Ranch. 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
13. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (1994). 
14. Id. 
15. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). 
16. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 & n.7, 1946 n.17. See also id. at 1952 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
17. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 64-65. All six respondents pleaded guilty 
in the Montana District Court to conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to 
sell, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (1987); additionally, respondent Richard Kurth 
was charged with criminal sale of dangerous drugs (marijuana), id. § 45-4-101; 
criminal possession of a dangerous drug (marijuana) with the intent to sell, id. § 
45-9-103; solicitation to commit the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous 
drug (marijuana) with intent to sell, id. § 45-4-101; and criminal possession of a 
dangerous drug (hashish), id. § 45-9-102. In re Kurth Ranch. 145 B.R. at 64-65. 
Additionally, in a separate proceeding, the county attorney filed a civil for-
feiture action seeking recovery of cash and equipment used in the marijuana oper-
ation. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. The respondents settled the forfeiture 
action with an agreement to forfeit $18,016.83 in cash and various items of equip-
ment. Id. The confiscated drugs were not involved in the forfeiture action because 
law enforcement agents destroyed them after inventory. Id. 
18. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 15-25-111(1). 
3
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ijuana, the tax is ten percent of the market value of the 
drugs19 or $100 per ounce, whichever is greater.20 Pursuant 
to the Act, the Montana Department of Revenue attempted to 
collect $900,000 in taxes21 on the marijuana plants,22 har-
vested marijuana,23 hash tar and hash Oil,24 plus interest 
and penalties.25 The Revenue Department initiated the civil 
tax proceeding about six weeks after the start of the criminal 
prosecution.26 
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, instituted by the 
Kurths after the State's attempt to collect tax and forfeiture 
proceeds,27 the Kurths objected to the Revenue Department's 
A "dangerous drug" is defined as a "drug, substance, or immediate precursor" in 
Schedules I through V. See § 15-25-102(1); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-32-101(6), 50-
32-222, 50-32-224, 50-32-226, 50-32-229, 50-32-232 (1993). "Although the tax return 
must be filed within 72 hours of arrest, imposition of the tax is not contingent 
upon criminal conviction nor even pursuit of a criminal prosecution." The Supreme 
Court, 1994 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure: Double Jeopardy- Tax on the 
Possession of Illegal Drugs, 108 HARv. L. REv. 139, 174 n.25 (1994). 
19. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 15-25-111(2)(a). 
Market value is determined by the Department of Revenue. Id. § 15-25-102(2). 
20. [d. § 15-25-111(2)(a), (b)(i). Hashish is taxed at the greater of market value 
or $250 per ounce. [d. § 15-25-111(2)(a), (b)(ii). 
21. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 68. This figure was judicially reduced by 
the bankruptcy court to approximately $181,000 on state constitutional grounds. 
Id. 
22. Marijuana is defined as "all plant material from the genus cannabis con-
taining tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or seeds of the genus capable of germination." 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(17) (1993). 
23. [d. 
24. Hashish is defined as "the mechanically processed or extracted plant mate-
rial that contains tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and is composed of resin from the 
cannabis plant." [d. § -101(14). 
25. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942-43. The civil tax proceeding was automat-
ically stayed in september 1988 when the Kurths petitioned for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. [d. at 1943; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & 
Supp. V). 
26. United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
(discussing Kurth Ranch). The Kurth Ranch Court stated that "[this case) involves 
separate sanctions imposed in successive proceedings." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 
1947 n.21. This amounts to a holding that a civil action and a criminal prosecu-
tion directed to the same offense, even when filed close in time, constitute two 
proceedings for double jeopardy purposes when pursued in separate cases and 
concluded at different times. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. at 1304 (holding that civil 
forfeiture is punishment for double jeopardy purposes); United States v. Torres, 28 
F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a nonpunitive civil proceeding did 
not bar a subsequent prison sentence for double jeopardy purposes). 
27. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942-43. The Kurths settled the civil for-
feiture proceeding with an agreement to forfeit cash and items of equipment. [d. 
4
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claim for unpaid drug taxes and challenged the constitutional-
ity of Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act.2B The Kurths ar-
gued, and the bankruptcy court agreed, that the tax constitut-
ed a second punishment for the same offense in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.29 The state coun-
tered that the tax was not a penalty because it was designed to 
recover law enforcement costs and was therefore remedia1.30 
Relying primarily on United States v. Halper,31 the bankrupt-
cy court rejected the State's argument, noting that the govern-
ment failed to provide an accounting of the actual damages or 
costs it incurred.32 More importantly, the court reasoned, the 
punitive character of the tax was evident because the Act pro-
moted the traditional aims of punishment: retribution and 
deterrence.33 The district court concurred with the bankruptcy 
court, holding that the dangerous drug tax constituted a sec-
ond punishment for the same criminal conduct.34 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court's decision, largely basing its conclusion on the 
state's failure to provide an accounting to justify the tax.35 
However, the court refused to hold the tax unconstitutional on 
its face, instead holding it unconstitutional as applied against 
the Kurths.36 Looking first to Halper, the court determined 
that a disproportionately large civil penalty can be punitive for 
double jeopardy purposes.37 Although Halper involved a civil 
penalty rather than a tax, the court of appeals found no dis-
tinction between a fine and the tax at issue in Kurth Ranch.3s 
The court determined that the main inquiry under Halper's 
double jeopardy analysis was whether the sanction imposed 
was rationally related to the damages the government suf-
28. See In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). 
29. See id. 
30. Id. at 74. 
31. 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding for the first time that a civil fine constitutes 
punishment violative of the double jeopardy clause). 
32. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 75. 
33. Id. at 75-76. 
34. In re Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21133, at 
*13 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991). 
35. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1311. 
38. See id. 
5
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fered. 39 The court of appeals concluded that the Kurths were 
entitled to an accounting to determine if the Montana tax 
constituted an impermissible second punishment under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.4o Due to the state's failure to offer 
any such evidence, the court held the tax unconstitutional as 
applied to the Kurths.41 
While Kurth Ranch was pending on appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court, in 
Sorenson v. State Dep't of Revenue,42 reversed two lower state 
court decisions that held that the Dangerous Drug Tax was a 
form of double jeopardy.43 The Sorenson court found that the 
legislature had intended to establish a civil, not a criminal, 
penalty and that the tax had a remedial purpose in addition to 
promoting retribution and deterrence.44 Notably, the court 
found Halper not controlling because that decision involved a 
civil penalty, not a tax.45 The Sorenson court concluded that 
the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax was not excessive and that 
a tax, unlike a civil sanction, requires no proof of the remedial 
costs incurred by the government.46 
39.Id. 
40. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at 1312. 
41. Id. 
42. 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992). 
43. Id. at 33. 
44. Id. at 31. 
45. Id. at 32-33. The Sorenson court stated: 
Id. at 33. 
Halper involved a civil sanction and a fixed penalty per 
offense which was not based on remedial costs. As men-
tioned, the penalty was $2,000 for each event regardless 
of how small the dollar amount was in terms of cost to 
the government. In contrast, the Montana Dangerous 
Drug Tax is an excise tax based on the quantity of drugs 
in the taxpayer's possession. 
46. Id. at 33. The Sorenson court announced: 
We note that both District Courts held· the tax was exces-
sive and punitive, not remedial, because the DOR failed 
to provide a summation of the costs of prosecution and 
societal costs of drug use. However, unlike the civil sanc-
tion in Halper where such proof may be required, a tax 
requires no proof of remedial costs on the part of the 
state. Commonwealth Edison Co. u. State of Montana 
(1980), 189 Mont. 191, 615 P.2d 847. In Commonwealth 
this Court held that the state is not required to defend 
the validity of an excise tax by offering a summation of 
6
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The Montana Supreme Court decision was directly at odds 
with the Ninth Circuit decision. Consequently, the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.47 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o 
person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb .... "48 Although the text mentions 
only harms to "life or limb," it is well settled that the Fifth 
Amendment also covers monetary penalties and imprison-
ment.49 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three 
possible actions: a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal;50 a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction;51 and multiple punishments for the same of-
fense.52 The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause apply 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.53 
The Clause does not prohibit multiple punishm"ents im-
posed in a single proceeding whether these punishments be a 
combination of prison plus a fine, consecutive terms of prison, 
or prison plus a forfeiture. 54 Because a legislature may autho-
rize multiple punishments under separate statutes for a single 
course of conduct, the multiple-punishment issue in the context 
of a single proceeding focuses solely on ensuring that the total 
punishment does not exceed legislative authorization.55 Thus, 
1d. 
the costs of governmental benefits. Commonwealth, 189 
Mont. at 207, 615 P.2d at 855·856. 
47. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993). 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989); Ex parte 
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 162, 173·176 (1874). 
50. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
51. See, e.g., In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). 
52. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 
(1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173. 
53. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
54. E.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 
U.S. 359, 366 (1983); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464 (7th Cir. 1994). 
55. E.g., Halper, 490 U.S. at 450·51; Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499·500; Hunter, 
7
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legislatively authorized multiple punishments are permissible 
under double jeopardy if imposed in a single proceeding, but 
impermissible if imposed in successive proceedings. 56 Addi-
tionally, the procedural safeguards of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause are not triggered by litigation between private par-
ties.57 However, when the government has imposed a criminal 
penalty, then seeks to impose additional punishment in a sec-
ond proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the gov-
ernment from seeking the second punishment for fear that it 
may be motivated by dissatisfaction with the sanction obtained 
in the first proceeding.58 
B. THE UNITED STATES V. HALPER PROPORTIONALITY 
ANALYSIS 
Before its decision in United States v. Halper,59 the Su-
preme Court had never invalidated a legislatively authorized 
459 U.S. at 368-69. "The only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases 
challenging multiple punishments (in the first proceeding) is to prevent the prose-
cutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater 
punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended." Whalen v. United States, 445 
U.S. 684, 697 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in 
original). 
[T)he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves 
principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The 
legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the 
legislature has acted courts may not impose more than 
one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors 
ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in 
more than one trial. 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
56. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69. See also Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 
1957 n.1 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (in the context of criminal 
proceedings); Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (in the context of civil proceedings). 
57. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451. But cf. United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 
U.S. 537 (1943) (involving a private party in a qui tam action (31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) 
(1994» bringing suit on behalf of and in the name of the United States and shar-
ing with the government the proceeds of the action). The Hess Court assumed but 
did not decide that a qui tam action could give rise to double jeopardy. Hess, 317 
U.S. at 548·49. 
58. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10. See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 
(1978) (finding that jeopardy "attaches" at the beginning of a criminal prosecution, 
when the jury is empaneled and sworn). See generally Annotation, Conviction from 
which Appeal is Pending as a Bar to Another Prosecution for the Same Offense, 61 
A.L.R. 2d 1224 (1958). 
59. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
8
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successive civil penalty as violative of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.6o In July 1985, Dr. Irwin Halper was convicted of 65 
separate violations of the Criminal False Claims Statute.61 
Each false claim involved a demand for twelve dollars in reim-
bursement for medical services worth only three dollars per 
claim.62 Dr. Halper was sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years and fined $5,000.63 In a subsequent civil proceeding un-
der the Civil False Claims Act,54 the Government sought to 
recover a $2,000 civil penalty for each of the 65 violations.55 
The district court held that a civil penalty more than 220 times 
greater than the government's accounted loss lacked the neces-
sary "rational relation" to the government's actual damages to 
justify such a penalty.66 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
government's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause only 
applied to punishment imposed in criminal proceedings.67 The 
Court determined that the labels "criminal" and "civil" were 
not controlling in a double jeopardy inquiry.68 The Court rea-
soned that while legislative intent is the initial determinant, a 
civil statute may be punitive in nature even if it is intended to 
be remedia1.69 The Court stated that "the determination 
whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the 
relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the 
penalty imposed and the purposes that penalty may fairly be 
60. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944·45; id. at 1956·57 (Scalia, J., joined 
by Thomas, J., dissenting). 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988) (which prohibits "mak[ing] or present[ingl ... any 
claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, 
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent."). 
62. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437. Thus, Dr. Halper submitted 65 false Medicare 
claims, Dr. Halper overcharged the federal government a total of $585. 
63. 1d. at 437. 
64. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729·31 (1982 & Supp. II) (which is violated when "[a] person 
not a member of an armed forces of the United States . . . (2) knowingly makes, 
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or 
fraudulent claim paid or approved." 1d. § 3729(a)(1)). The Act has since been 
amended. 
65. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438 (civil fine totaling $130,000). See also 31 U.S.C. § 
3729. 
66. Halper, 490 U.S. at 439. 
67. 1d. at 441·42. 
68. 1d. at 447. 
69. 1d. at 447·48. 
9
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said to serve."70 Thus, the Halper Court concluded that the 
legislature's description of the Civil False Claims Act as "civil" 
did not foreclose the possibility that the sanction may be puni-
tive rather than remedial. 71 
The Halper Court then determined that a civil penalty 
would be remedial in character if it sought to reimburse the 
government for actual costs arising from the defendant's con-
duct.72 The Court found a "tremendous disparity" between the 
government's approximated expenses of $16,000 and Dr. 
Halper's liability of $130,000.73 Because the penalty was 
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" in relation to the 
government's expenses, the Court reasoned that the penalty 
bore no rational relation to the goal of compensating the gov-
ernment.74 The Halper Court concluded that the penalty con-
stituted a multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause because it crossed the line between remedy and 
punishment.75 The Court, however, declined to transform the 
penalty into a criminal action with all the attendant consti-
tutional protections.76 
70. Id. at 448. 
71. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. 
72. Id. at 449-50. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
district court to determine what portion of the penalty ordered pursuant to the 
Civil False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31) could be sustained as bearing a 
rational relation to the goal of compensating the government for its actual loss. Id. 
at 452. 
"It should be noted that Halper's disproportionality analysis is required only 
in those [civil) cases where there has been a separate criminal conviction." In re 
Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1311 (1993). 
73. Halper, 490 U.S. at 452. 
74. Id. at 449. 
75. See id. at 450. The Court remanded the case to permit the government to 
demonstrate that the district court's assessment of its injuries was in error. Id. at 
453. 
76. See id. at 447. It appears that the Court has drawn a fine line between 
when a "civil" penalty constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes and 
when a penalty is so punitive that the proceeding necessitates the same constitu-
tional safeguards provided for defendants in traditional prosecutions. For instance, 
a criminal defendant has a privilege against self-incrimination and a right to an 
indictment by a grand jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under the Sixth Amendment, 
the criminal defendant has the right "to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury . . . , and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process . . . , and 
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
10
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Thus, Halper requires that if a sanction serves only the 
goals of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence, that 
sanction should be characterized as punishment for purposes of 
a double jeopardy analysis. 77 Although the Supreme Court 
qualified its ruling as "a rule for the rare case," Halper signi-
fied a substantial shift in the Court's application of double 
jeopardy jurisprudence.78 
C. MONTANA'S DANGEROUS DRUG TAX ACT 
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Ace9 (hereinafter "the 
Act") imposes a tax "on the possession and storage of danger-
ous drugs.,,8o The tax is collected only after any state or feder-
al fines or forfeitures have been satisfied.81 The tax is either 
ten percent of the assessed market value of the drugs, or a 
specified amount depending on the drug, whichever is great-
77. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. See also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 
2810 n.12 (1993). Austin broadened the Halper test by incorporating Halper's dicta, 
rather than its holding, into its analysis. The explicit holding of Halper was as 
follows: 
[w)e therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a 
criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an addition-
al civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction 
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a 
deterrent or retribution. 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). 
However, the Austin Court broadened Halper by emphasizing Halper's dicta: 
"it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedi-
al purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or 
deterrent purposes, is punishment ... " Id. at 448 (emphasis added). See generally 
Robin M. Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending 
Constitutional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GoLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1994). 
78. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449. The Halper Court stated: "[w)hat we announce 
now is a rule for the rare case, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific 
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the 
damages he has caused." Id. 
79. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25·101 to ·123 (1987». The Kurth Ranch Court's opinion 
refers only to the 1987 edition of the Montana Code, the version in effect at the 
time of the Kurths' arrest. 
80. Id. § 15·25·111(1). 
81. Id. § 15·25·111(3). This section has since been amended at § 15-25-111(1} 
(1993). A 1989 amendment substituted "may be collected before" for "must be 
collected only after," referring to when the tax can be collected in- relation to the 
satisfaction of federal fines and forfeitures. 
11
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er.82 The Act gives the Montana Department of Revenue au-
thority to assess the market value of the drug at issue.sa The 
Montana legislature determined that the specified amount of 
tax shall be $100 per ounce for marijuana and $250 per ounce 
for hashish.84 At least twenty-six other states tax marijuana 
at approximately the same rate.S5 Funds collected from the 
Montana Tax are earmarked for youth evaluations, chemical 
abuse assessment and aftercare, juvenile detention facilities, 
and funding for drug enforcement agencies.86 
According to the Act's preamble, the Montana legislature 
recognized "the existence in Montana of a large and profitable 
dangerous drug industry .... "S7 While not endorsing illegal 
82. Id. § -111(2)(a), (b)(i). 
83. Id. § -111(2)(a); id. § -102(2). "There is no unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative powers to the [Department of Revenue] to make a determination of 
market value." In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). 
84. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 105-25-
111(2)(b)(i-ii). 
85. See ALA. CODE § 40-17A-8(1) (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01 
(1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-102(1) (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-
651(b)(1) (1993); FLA. STAT. § 212.0505 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-15-6(1) (Supp. 
1993); IDAHO CODE § 63-4203(2)(a) (Supp. 1993); 35 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 520/9(1) 
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-1 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 453B.7(1) (Supp. 
1994); KAN. S1'AT. ANN. § 79-5202(a)(I) (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
47:2601(1) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 36, § 4434(1) (Supp. 
1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 64K, § 8(1) (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 297D.08(1) 
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4303(1)(a) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
372A.070(b)(1) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-18A-3A(5) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
105-113.107(1) (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-36.1-08(1) (1993); OKLA. STAT., Tit. 
68, § 450.2(1) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 44-49-9(1) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED· 
LAwS ANN. ch. 10-5OA (1985); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 159.101(b)(2) (1992); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 59-19-103(1)(a) (1992); WIS. STAT. § 139.88(1) (Supp. 1993). 
The supreme courts of Florida, Idaho, and South Dakota have found their 
states' drug taxing statute to be unconstitutional on their face. See, e.g., State 
Dep't of Revenue V. Herre, 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the Flori-
da statute providing for a sales tax on transactions involving marijuana and con-
trolled 8ubstances (FLA. STAT. § 212.0505 (1991) violates the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho 
1991) (holding that the 1989 version of Idaho's Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act (IDAHO 
CODE § 63-4201 et seq. (1989) violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination; but the Smith court noted that the 1990 amended version of the 
Act, which added § 63-4206, cured the constitutional deficiency); State V. Roberts, 
384 N.W.2d 688, 691 (S.D. 1986) (holding that South Dakota's Luxury Tax on 
Controlled Substances and Marijuana (S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. ch. 10-50A (1985) 
violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
86. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 105-25-122(1), 
(2). 
87. Id. (pmbl.). 
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drug enterprises, the legislature concluded that in light of the 
economic impact such illegal business has on Montana, "[it is 
appropriate] ... to tax those who profit from drug-related 
offenses and to dispose of the tax proceeds through providing 
additional anti-crime initiatives without burdening law abiding 
taxpayers."88 Additionally, the Act authorized the Department 
of Revenue to adopt rules to administer and enforce the tax.89 
Acknowledging the practical realities involved in taxing an 
illegal activity, the Revenue Department noted that the tax-
payer has no obligation to file a return or to pay any tax un-
less and until he or she is arrested.90 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
1. Halper's Proportionality Test £s Inapplicable to Tax 
Statutes 
In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,91 the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's application 
of the Halper analysis to the civil tax proceeding instituted 
against the Kurths.92 The Court recognized that in Halper it 
88. 1d. 
89. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 105-25-113(2). 
For example, Mont. Admin. R. 42.34.102(1) (1988) provides that the taxpayers 
must file a return within 72 hours of their arrest. The rule also provides that law 
enforcement personnel shall complete the form and give the taxpayer an opportu-
nity to 8ign it. 1d. R. 42.34.102(3). If the taxpayer refuses to provide a signature, 
the rule require8 the officer to file the form within 72 hours of the arrest. 1d. The 
Montana Department of Revenue justifies this expedited process because of the 
criminal nature of the assessment. See id. R. 42.34.103(3). 
90. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941-42. Some of the difficulties of taxing 
illegal activities include the fact that the taxpayer will not voluntarily identify 
himself as subject to the tax due to the illegal nature of the activity. Moreover, 
hinging the Montana drug tax on an arrest is necessary to protect the taxpayer's 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Mont. Admin. R. 42.34.102(1) 
(1988), which provides that the tax return "shall be filed within 72 hours of ... 
arrest," works to protect the taxpayers Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Other taxing schemes, such as purchasing tax stamps, compel the 
taxpayer to voluntarily incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
91. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). 
92. See id. at 1943-45. The Kurth Ranch Court determined that tax statutes, 
unlike civil sanctions, are intended to raise revenue and deter conduct, not to 
reimburse the government for costs incurred it. See id. at 1945-46. 
13
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determined that a civil penalty may constitute punishment for 
the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.93 However, the Su-
preme Court found a constitutional distinction between a fine 
and a tax.94 
The Court observed that civil penalties, criminal fines, 
civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain features which are 
subject to constitutional constraints: the raising of government 
revenues, imposition of fiscal burdens on individuals, and the 
deterrence of certain behavior.95 However, the Court deter-
mined that while penalties, fines, and forfeitures are normally 
characterized as sanctions, taxes are distinguishable because 
they are generally motivated by revenue-raising rather than 
punitive purposes.96 Tax statutes, unlike civil penalty stat-
utes, need not equate with the government's proven remedial 
costS.97 In light of the unique standing of tax statutes, the 
Supreme Court maintained that the proper inquiry in Kurth 
Ranch was whether the drug tax had punitive characteristics 
that would subject it to the constraints of the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.98 
2. Montana's Drug Tax is not Immune from Double Jeopardy 
Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court began its double jeopardy inquiry by 
93. Id. at 1945. 
94. Id. at 1945-46. Unlike the civil sanction in Halper, which was intended to 
reimburse the government for costs it incurred, tax statutes are intended to raise 
revenue and deter conduct. Thus, the Court reasoned, Halper's proportionality 
analysis was inapplicable to a tax statute. Id. at 1944-46. 
95. Id. at 1945-46. See Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding a defendant con-
victed and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil penalty im-
posed against him for the same offense in a separate proceeding). See also, 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (reasoning that a statute imposing 
a tax on unlawful conduct may be invalid because its reporting requirements com-
pel taxpayers to incriminate themselves); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) 
(holding a government may not impose criminal fines without first establishing 
guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 
2801 (1993) (holding a civil forfeiture may violate the Eighth Amendment's pro-
scription against excessive fines). 
96. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. See also Sorenson v. State Dep't of Reve-
nue, 836 P.2d 29, 32-33 (Mont. 1992). 
97. See id. 
98. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945-46. 
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acknowledging that a State may legitimately tax criminal 
activities.99 The Court noted that, although no double jeopar-
dy challenge was at issue, it had previously upheld a $100-per-
ounce federal tax on marijuana in United States v. 
Sanchez. lOo The Kurth Ranch Court suggested that "Montana 
no doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana, 
for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpayer for 
the same offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the 
same proceeding that resulted in his conviction."lol 
The Court recalled that in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,102 
it recognized that "there comes a time in the extension of the 
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its charac-
ter as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteris-
tics of regulation and punishment. "103 The Kurth Ranch 
Court then explained that its comment in Magnano Co., when 
considered in light of Halper's statement that labels are not 
controlling in a double jeopardy inquiry, "indicates that a tax 
is not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply because it 
is a tax. ,,104 
3. Montana's Drug Tax is Punitive in Nature 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that neither a high tax 
rate, nor a deterrent purpose, would automatically label the 
marijuana tax as punishment.105 The majority noted that a 
99. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994). See 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968) (holding that an activities un-
lawfulness does not prevent its taxation); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 
287, 293 (1935) (holding that illegal activity may be taxed). 
100. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946-47. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 
U.S. 42 (1950) (upholding the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2590(a)(2), now 
repealed (last codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964», which imposed a federal tax on 
marijuana at the rate of $100-per-ounce, against a constitutional challenge that 
the tax was a penalty, rather than a true tax). The tax at issue was later held to 
be unconstitutional in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 29 (1969), on the 
grounds that it violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
101. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945. 
102. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (upholding against a due 
process challenge a steep excise tax imposed by the State of Washington on pro-
cessors of oleomargarine during the Great Depression). 
103. Kurth Ranch. 114 S. Ct. at 1946 (citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 
U.S. at 44). 
104. [d. 
105. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946-47 (1994). 
15
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portion of the assessment against the Kurths was eight times 
the drug's market value. lOS Finding this to be a "remarkably 
high tax" which "appears to be unrivaled,,,107 the Court ana-
lyzed the Act's preamble,108 observing that the legislature ap-
parently intended the drug tax to deter the possession of mari-
juana.109 However, aware that it had previously sustained a 
$100-per-ounce federal marijuana tax/10 and that many valid 
taxes "are also both high and motivated to some extent by an 
interest in deterrence,,,m the Court held that these features 
alone did not render the drug tax punitive. ll2 
See also United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). 
106. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. This portion was the lower-grade mari-
juana ("shake"). The Revenue Department attempted to tax 100 pounds of shake 
at $100-per-ounce for a total tax of $160,000. The Deputy Sheriffs Drug Tax Re-
port valued the shake at $200-per-pound wholesale market' value, resulting in a 
tax eight times its market value. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 72 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. 1990). 
107. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 & n.17. 
lOB. Id. at 1946 & n.1B. Specifically, the Kurth Ranch Court emphasized the 
last section of the preamble which provides: 
Id. 
THEREFORE, the Legislature of the State of Montana 
does not wish to give credence to the notion that the 
manufacturing, selling, and use of dangerous drugs is 
legal or otherwise proper, but finds it appropriate in view 
of the economic impact of such drugs to tax those who 
profit from drug-related offenses and to dispose of the tax 
proceeds through providing additional anticrime initiatives 
without burdening law abiding taxpayers. 
109. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946-47. The Kurth Ranch Court stated: 
although the Act's preamble evinces a clear motivation to 
raise revenue, it also indicates that the tax will provide 
for anticrime initiatives by 'burdening' violators of the law 
instead of 'law abiding taxpayers'; that use of dangerous 
drugs is not acceptable; and that the Act is not intended 
to 'give credence' to any notion that manufacturing, sell-
ing, or using drugs is legal or proper. 
Id. at n.1a. 
110. Id. at 1946-47. Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44. The Sanchez Court noted that "[ilt 
is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it 
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activity taxed." Id. 
111. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. The Kurth Ranch Court referred specifi-
cally to taxes on cigarettes and alcohol. For example, the Court acknowledged that 
the current 24-cent-per-pack federal tax on cigarettes could, under a new health 
plan, be constitutionally increased to 99 cents, resulting in a total tax burden 
which surpasses the ao percent rate that Montana imposed on the higher grade 
marijuana. Id. at 1946 n.17. 
112. Id. at 1946-47. 
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Continuing its double jeopardy inquiry, the Supreme Court 
considered the Act's "other unusual features" which set it apart 
from other taxes.113 The Court noted first that the Montana 
tax was conditioned on the commission of a crime, evincing a 
penal rather than a revenue-raising intent. 114 The Kurth 
Ranch Court then emphasized that the Montana tax was ex-
acted only after the defendant was arrested for the same con-
duct which gave rise to the tax.U6 Thus, the entire class of 
taxpayers subject to the Montana tax is comprised of those 
who have been arrested for possessing marijuana. 116 
The Court then addressed the Revenue Department's argu-
ment that the Montana drug tax is similar to the mixed-motive 
"sin" taxes regularly imposed on cigarettes and alcohol. l17 In 
distinguishing these taxes from the one at bar, the Court as-
serted that sin taxes are justified because the products' bene-
fit11S to society outweigh the products' harm.u9 This high 
benefit-to-harm ratio justifies permitting the manufacture of 
such products as long as those who buy and sell them pay high 
taxes that reduce consumption and bolster government reve-
nues.120 However, the Court maintained that the justifica-
113. [d. at 1947. The Kurth Ranch Court concluded that the drug tax constitut· 
ed punishment because it hinged on the commission of a crime and was levied on 
goods the taxpayer never lawfully possessed. [d. at 1947-48. 
114. [d. at 1947. The Court emphasized that "this condition is 'significant of 
penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.'" (citing United 
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (concluding that a tax was moti· 
vated by penal instead of revenue· raising intent in part because the taxpayer had 
to pay an additional sum based on his illegal conduct». See also Sanchez, 340 
U.S. at 45. The Kurth Ranch Court referred to Sanchez as a case in which the 
absence of such a condition supported its conclusion that the federal marijuana tax 
was a civil rather than criminal sanction. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. The 
Federal Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2590(a)(2), now repealed (last codified at 
26 U.S.C. §§ 4741), taxed the transfer of marijuana to a person who has not paid 
a special tax and registered. Under the statute, the transferor's liability arose 
when the transferee failed to pay the tax. The Sanchez Court reasoned that 
"[s)ince his tax liability does not in effect rest on criminal conduct, the tax can be 
properly called a civil rather than a criminal sanction." Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45. 
115. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. The Kurth Ranch Court recognized benefits such as creating employ· 
ment, satisfying consumer demand, and providing tax revenues. 
119. [d. The Kurth Ranch Court did not specify the types of harm products 
such as alcohol and cigarettes inflict on society. 
120. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. 
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tions for sin taxes "vanish when the taxed activity is complete-
ly forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that 
might support such a tax could be equally well served by in-
creasing the fine imposed upon conviction. »121 
Lastly, the Supreme Court found the Montana tax unusual 
because although it purported to be a tax on "the possession 
and storage of dangerous drugs,» it was levied on goods the 
taxpayer never lawfully possessed.122 Because statutes which 
amount to a confiscation of property have been held unconsti-
tutional,123 the Court reasoned that "a tax on previously con-
fiscated goods is at least questionable.»124 
Concluding its analysis, the Supreme Court found 
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax to be "too far-removed in cru-
cial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape charac-
terization as punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy 
analysis. »125 The Court therefore held that the tax constituted 
a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause and "must be imposed during the first prosecution or 
not at all.»126 The Court added that the civil tax proceeding 
initiated by Montana against the Kurths was the "functional 
equivalent" of a second criminal prosecution in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.127 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 1948. 
123. [d. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) (holding a federal gift 
tax to be so "arbitrary and capricious" as to cause it to violate the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause); Bee aLBo Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927) 
(holding a federal estate tax to be "arbitrary and capricious" and thus violative of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
124. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. Noting that the State destroyed the 
marijuana crop before assessing the tax against the Kurths, the Court determined 
that the tax had a definite punitive character. The Kurth Ranch Court stated: "[a) 
tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer never law-
fully possessed has an unmistakable punitive character. This tax, imposed on crim-
inals and no others, departs so far from normal revenue laws as to become a form 
of punishment." [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. The Kurth Ranch Court did not expand on this statement, nor did it 
clarify whether the Montana drug tax proceeding, regardless of when initiated, 
required all of the criminal-procedure guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments. The Courts' statement that "Montana no doubt could collect its tax on the 
possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpay-
18
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B. DISSENT 
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
In dissent,128 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that 
Kurth Ranch represents the first time the Court subjected a 
tax statute to a double jeopardy inquiry.129 The Chief Justice 
supported the Court's decision to abandon the Ninth Circuit's 
application of the Halper mode of analysis to the Montana 
drug tax. 130 However, the Chief Justice maintained that after 
properly refuting the Halper analysis, the Court then imple-
mented "a hodgepodge of criteria - many of which have been 
squarely rejected by our previous decisions - to be used in 
deciding whether a tax statute qualifies as 'punishment.'"13l 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the Court's pre-
sumption that a high tax rate combined with a deterrent pur-
pose "lend support" to the view of the drug tax as punish-
ment.132 Citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton/33 Sonzinsky v. 
United States,134 and United States v. Sanchez,135 the Chief 
er for the same offense ... ," when contrasted with the Court's statement that 
the drug tax "was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecu-
tion ... ," only exacerbates this uncertainty. 1d. at 1945, 1948. 
128. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-60 (1994) 
(dissenting opinions by Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, J.; and Scalia, J., joined by 
Thomas, J.). 
129. 1d. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
130. 1d. In agreement with the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained 
that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Halper "says nothing about 
the possible double jeopardy concerns of a tax, as opposed to a civil fine .... " 1d. 
131. 1d. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); James v. 
United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 
(1937); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); 
See infra notes 133-36, 142-44 for the holdings of the above decisions. 
132. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
133. 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (upholding against a due process challenge a steep 
excise tax imposed by the State of Washington on processors of oleomargarine 
during the Great Depression). 
134. 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upholding an annual federal firearms tax as a valid 
exercise of the taxing power of Congress). The Sonzinsky Court noted that "it has 
long been established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an 
exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome 
or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed." [d. at 513. 
135. 340 U.S. 42 (1950). The Sanchez Court stated that "lilt is beyond serious 
question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discour-
ages, or even definitely deters the activity taxed." 1d. at 44. 
19
Ravazzini: Drug Tax
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
350 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:331 
Justice concluded that it is firmly established that a 
burdensomely high tax rate or outright deterrent purpose are 
not fatal to a tax's validity.13s 
Next, the Chief Justice criticized the discussion of "other 
unusual features" of the Montana drug tax. l37 The majority 
noted that the Montana tax was conditioned on the commission 
of a crime and exacted only after arrest.13S The Chief Justice 
argued that this characteristic merely reflected the practical 
realities involved in the process of taxing illegal drug enter-
prises. l39 The illegal status of the taxed activity prevents tax-
payers from voluntarily identifying themselves as subject to 
the tax. 140 
Chief Justice Rehnquist then considered the majority's 
statement that the justifications for mixed-motive "sin" taxes 
vanished when the taxed activity was illegal. l4l The Chief 
Justice found that statement contradicted the findings in Mar-
chetti v. United States/42 United States v. Constantine/43 
and James v. United States. 144 According to Chief Justice 
136. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief 
Justice Rehnquist then asserted that this case law applied to the Montana drug 
statute because under Marchetti and Constantine illegal activity may be taxed. ld. 
(citing Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 44 (holding that an activities unlawfulness does not 
prevent its taxation»; Constantine, 296 U.S. at 293 (holding that illegal activity 
may be taxed). The Constantine Court explained that "Itlhe burden of lal tax may 
be imposed alike on the just and the unjust. It would be strange if one carrying 
on a business the subject of an excise should be able to excuse himself from pay-
ment by the plea that in carrying on the business he was violating the law." ld. 
137. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
138. ld. at 1947. 
139. ld. at 1950. Some of the difficulties of taxing illegal activities include the 
fact that the taxpayer will not voluntarily identify himself as subject to the tax 
due to the illegal nature of the activity. Moreover, hinging the Montana drug tax 
on an arrest is necessary to protect the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self- incrimination. Other taxing schemes, such as purchasing tax stamps, 
compel the taxpayer to voluntarily incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. See id at 1950-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
140. ld. at 1950 n.2. It should be added that Mont. Admin. R. 42.34.102(1) 
(1988), which provides that the tax return "shall be filed within 72 hours of . . . 
arrest," works to protect the taxpayers Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
141. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
142. 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (holding that an activities unlawfulness does not pre-
vent its taxation). 
143. 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (holding that illegal activity may be taxed). 
144. 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (holding that any monetary gain from illegal activity 
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Rehnquist, the majority overemphasized the fact that the por-
tion of the assessment imposed on the lower-grade marijuana 
was eight times the drug's market value,145 when the tax im-
posed on the higher grade marijuana amounted to only 80 
percent of its market value.146 The Chief Justice stressed that 
the relevant inquiry in Kurth Ranch should be whether the tax 
rate is so high that it can only be characterized as serving a 
punitive purpose.147 Chief Justice Rehnquist then compared 
the Montana drug tax with sin taxes on legal products such as 
alcohol and cigarettes, arguing the respective tax rates are not 
so dissimilar as to invalidate the drug tax.14S The Chief Jus-
tice indicated that the difference was justified because the 
drug tax was the only tax collected from individuals engaged in 
the illegal drug business, and the vast majority of the profit-
able underground drug enterprises would escape taxation alto-
gether. 149 
Lastly, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined the majority's 
finding that the Montana drug tax was "unusual" because it 
was assessed on drugs that the Kurths neither owned nor 
possessed at the time of taxation.150 He found it inconceivable 
that in order to tax the Kurths it would be necessary to return 
the illegal drugs to their possession.151 In analyzing the pre-
constituted taxable income). See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
145. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The 
majority merely footnotes the fact that the tax imposed on the higher quality 
marijuana amounted to only 80 percent of the product's market value. In the same 
footnote, the Court then averaged the effective tax rates on the two grades of 
marijuana, resulting in a tax rate of four times the market value. [d. at 1946 
n.17. 
146. [d. at 1951-52. 
147. [d. at 1952. 
148. [d. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked at the current 24-cents-
per-pack federal tax on cigarettes under 26 U.S.C. § 5701(b) (1994). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that "[wlhile this does not exceed the cost of a pack of ciga-
rettes, the current proposal to boost the cigarette tax to 99 cents per pack could 
lead to a total tax on cigarettes in some jurisdictions at a rate higher than the 
80% rate utilized in this case for the marijuana bud." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 
1937, 1952 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
149. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) .. 
150. [d. at 1951. 
151. [d. Cf, Constantine, 296 U.S. at 293, stating "lilt would be strange if one 
carrying on a business the subject of an excise should be able to excuse himself 
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amble to the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act,152 the Chief 
Justice looked beyond its description as a tax on "storage and 
possession," and determined that the Act was passed for the 
legitimate purpose of raising revenue from the illicit drug 
industry. 153 
Although he conceded that an assessment denominated a 
"tax" could, "under some conceivable circumstances, constitute 
'punishment'" under the Double Jeopardy Clause/54 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that such was not the case in this 
context. 155 The Chief Justice concluded that because 
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax had the legitimate non-penal 
purpose of increasing government revenue, and the valid pur-
pose of deterring criminal conduct, it did not violate double 
jeopardy.156 
2. Justice O'Connor 
In dissent, Justice O'Connor felt that Montana's Danger-
ous Drug Tax should be subject to double jeopardy scruti-
ny.157 However, unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit's finding that the Halper proportionality 
analysis controlled.158 She reasoned there was no "constitu-
tional distinction" between a civil penalty and a tax. 159 
In light of the Halper decision Justice O'Connor deter-
mined that the central inquiry was whether Montana's drug 
152. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987)(pmbl.). 
153. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief 
Justice Rehnquist made this determination "[altter reviewing the structure and 
language [as well as the purpose and effect) of the tax provision and comparing 
the rate of taxation with similar types of sin taxes imposed on lawful prod-
ucts ... " ld. at 1952. 
154. ld. at 1951. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1952. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the tax was 
nonpunitive in nature and therefore not an independent "jeopardy." Id. 
157. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (1994) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
158. ld. at 1953-55. Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the Ninth Circuit's 
application of the Halper proportionality analysis, she argued that the Ninth Cir-
cuit misapplied Halper's analysis. 
159. Id. at 1953. 
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tax was punitive. 160 Applying the Halper analysis,161 she 
maintained that the Kurths must first have shown that the 
amount of the assessment bore no rational relationship to the 
state's nonpunitive objectives.162 If the Kurths met this re-
quirement, the burden would shift to the state to justify the 
tax by way of an accounting of its actual 10ss.163 Justice 
O'Connor therefore concluded that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals improperly placed the burden of an accounting on the 
state before the Kurths had shown a lack of a rational rela-
tionship between the amount of the tax and the state's 
nonpunitive objectives. l64 
Justice O'Connor noted that the majority avoided the issue 
of the Ninth Circuit's error by holding the Halper proportion-
ality analysis inapplicable to taxes.165 The Montana drug tax 
should be viewed as a rough remedial surrogate for the costs of 
apprehending, prosecuting, and incarcerating the Kurths. 166 
160. Id. For Justice O'Connor, if imposition of the tax was a punishment, the 
tax assessment would require a second criminal proceeding prohibited by the Fifth 
Amendment. That is, if the tax proceeding truly inflicted punishment in the tradi-
tional sense, the proceeding would require the criminal procedural protections 
provided to defendants in criminal prosecutions. (It does not appear that Justice 
O'Connor distinguished between punishment violative of double jeopardy and pun-
ishment which necessitates a criminal proceeding with all the attendant constitu-
tional safeguards). See HARv. L. REV., supra note 18, at 175 n.37. 
Id. 
161. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
[W]hether an exaction is punitive entails a two-part inqui-
ry: . . . [1] the defendant must first show the absence of 
a rational relationship between the amount of the sanc-
tion and the government's nonpunitive objectives; [2] the 
burden then shifts to the government to justify the sanc-
tion with reference to the particular case. 
162. Id. at 1954-55. 
163. Id. at 1954. 
164. Id. at 1954-55. Justice O'Connor stated that every state statute is entitled 
to a presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, in the double jeopardy context, "a 
sanction denominated as civil must be presumed to be nonpunitive. This presump-
tion would be rendered nugatory if the government were required to prove that 
the sanction is in fact nonpunitive before imposing it in a particular case." Id. 
165. Id. at 1955. 
166. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1953-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
The consequences of this decision are astounding. The 
State of Montana-along with about half of the other 
States-is now precluded from ever imposing the drug tax 
on a person who has been punished for a possessory drug 
offense. A defendant who is arrested, tried, and convicted 
23
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Finally, Justice O'Connor urged that the majority's decision 
was "entirely unnecessary to preserve individual liberty," be-
cause the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause167 
limits the extent of legislated punishments. l68 
3. Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) 
In dissent, Justice Scalia disputed the majority's "belief 
that there is a multiple-punishments component of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.,,169 While acknowledging that many cases 
have stated that the clause protects against successive punish-
ments for the same criminal offense,170 Justice Scalia coun-
tered that "the repetition of a dictum does not turn it into a 
holding."l7l Justice Scalia asserted that the Double Jeopardy 
[d. at 1955. 
for possession of one ounce of marijuana cannot be taxed 
$100 therefore, even though the State's law enforcement 
costs in such a case average more than $4,000. 
Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[tlhe State and Federal Governments 
spend vast sums on drug control activities . . . (approximately $27 billion in fiscal 
year 1991). The Kurths are directly responsible for some of these expenditures . . . 
apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of the Kurths will cost the State of 
Montana at least $120,000." [d. at 1953·54 (parenthetical in original). Justice 
O'Connor concluded that "today's decision will be felt acutely by law.abiding tax· 
payers, because it will seriously undermine the ability of the State and Federal 
Governments to collect recompense for the immense costs criminals impose on our 
society." [d. at 1955. See also United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 
1994) (summarizing various sources which estimate that illegal drug sales produce 
approximately $80 to $100 billion per year while exacting $60 to $120 billion per 
year in costs to the government and society). 
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
168. Kurth Ranch, ll4 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See id. at 
1958 n.2 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Alexander v. 
United States, ll3 S. Ct. 2766 (1993), is the first Supreme Court case to apply 
the Excessive Fines Clause to criminaVin personam proceedings); Austin v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civ· 
Win rem forfeiture proceedings). See also Browning.Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 
492 U.S. 257, 283·84 (1989) (discussing incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause 
and holding that the clause does not apply to punitive damages). 
169. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, ll4 S. Ct. 1937, 1955·60 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). 
170. [d. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498·99 (1984); North Carolina 
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 
(1874) . 
171. Kurth Ranch, ll4 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis· 
senting). In his dissent in Kurth Ranch, Justice Scalia argued that the Supreme 
Court's decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a 
defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil 
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Clause as first put forth by the Framers of the Fifth Amend-
ment did not contemplate the prohibition of multiple punish-
. ments.172 In Justice Scalia's view: "'[t]o be put in jeopardy' 
does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by its terms this 
provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multi-
ple prosecutions."173 According to Justice Scalia, the reliance 
on a no-multiple-punishments rule must derive solely from the 
due process requirement that cumulative punishments be au-
thorized by the legislature.174 In support of this contention 
penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a separate proceeding), "was 
in error." [d. at 1958. 
172. [d. at 1955-57. Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Frankfurter's reasoning 
in United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943): 
For legislation . . . providing two sanctions for the same 
misconduct, enforceable in separate proceedings, one a 
conventional criminal prosecution, and the other a forfei-
ture proceeding or a civil action as upon a debt, was 
quite common when the Fifth Amendment was framed by 
Congress. . . . It would do violence to proper regard for 
the framers of the Fifth Amendment to assume that they 
contemporaneously enacted and continued to enact legisla-
tion that was offensive to the guarantees of the double 
jeopardy clause which they had proposed for ratification. 
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955-56 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (citing United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring». 
173. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
174. [d. at 1956-57. Justice Scalia traced "[t)he belief that there is a multiple-
punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause" to Ex parte Lange, 85 
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined 
by Thomas, J., dissenting). 
In that case, the lower court sentenced Lange to both one 
year of imprisonment and a $200 fine for stealing mail 
bags from the Post Office, under a statute that authorized 
a maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment or a 
fine not to exceed $200. The Court, acknowledging that 
the sentence was in excess of statutory authorization, 
issued a writ of habeas corpus. Lange has since been 
cited as though it were decided exclusively on the basis of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, and n.11; in fact, Justice 
Miller's opinion for the Court rested the decision on . . . 
both the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment. See Lange, 18 Wall. at 170, 176, 178. 
The opinion went out of its way not to rely exclusively on 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, in order to avoid deciding 
whether it applied to prosecutions not literally involving 
'life or limb.' See id. at 170. It is clear that the Due 
Process Clause alone suffices to support the decision, 
25
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Justice Scalia noted that until Halper the Court had never 
struck down a legislatively authorized successive punish-
ment. 175 
Before Halper, Justice Scalia explained, the validity of the 
no-multiple-punishments rule was of little importance because 
the Double Jeopardy Clause's ban on successive criminal prose-
cutions rendered irrelevant any consideration of successive 
punishments. 176 In addition, he argued that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses have been 
available to protect criminals from unrestricted multiple pun-
ishment.177 Furthermore, civil proceedings subsequent to 
criminal prosecutions were not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause even if they had the potential to impose penalties.17s 
Justice Scalia noted that when the Halper Court extended the 
no-multiple-punishments restriction to civil penalties, the rule 
experienced an unwarranted expansion.179 
since the guarantee of the process provided by the law of 
the land assures prior legislative authorization for whatev-
er punishment is imposed. 
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
175. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
176. [d. at 1957. Justice Scalia pointed out that "the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
ban on successive criminal prosecutions would make surplusage of any distinct 
protection against additional punishment imposed in a successive prosecution, since 
the prosecution itself would be barred." [d. 
177. [d. at 1958-59. The Eighth Amendment provides that "Ielxcessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Justice Scalia emphasized that "the Due Pro-
cess Clause keeps punishment within the bounds established by the legislature, 
and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses place sub-
stantive limits upon what these legislated bounds may be." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1958 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stressed 
that "Imlultiple punishment is . . . restricted by the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause insofar as its nature is concerned, and by the Excessive Fines 
Clause insofar as its cumulative extent is concerned." [d. at 1959. 
178. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). In support of his argument, Justice Scalia relied on United States v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984) (holding a gun owner's ac-
quittal on criminal charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in 
rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms), and One Lot Emerald Cut 
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1972) (holding a forfeiture of imported 
merchandise is not barred by a prior acquittal). 
179. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Convinced that Halper "was in error," Justice Scalia anticipated the social 
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Justice Scalia also criticized the majority's statement that 
the tax proceeding initiated by Montana was "the functional 
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the 
Kurths in jeopardy a second time" for the same offense. 180 
Justice Scalia criticized that statement for its implicit assump-
tion that any proceeding that inflicts punishment, in the con-
text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is a criminal prosecu-
tion.1s1 Justice Scalia reasoned that if the Court accurately 
costs of following "the fictional, Halper.created multiple-punishments prohibition," 
such as offenders avoiding criminal punishment because a civil penalty has already 
been imposed on them. [d. at 1958-59. Justice Scalia reasoned that "if there is a 
constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments, the order of punishment cannot 
possibly make any difference." ld. at 1958. Since Justice Scalia wrote his dissent 
in Kurth Ranch, a number of courts have grappled with the notion of disallowing 
criminal punishment because a civil sanction has already been imposed. In the 
recent United States District Court case, United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 
1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994), for example, defendant McCaslin's criminal sentence was 
vacated on double jeopardy grounds. The Court held that because the government 
had already completed a civil forfeiture of McCaslin's residence, his criminal sen-
tence constituted a second punishment for the same offense in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. ld. at 1307. 
180. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (citing Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948). 
181. ld. Justice Scalia found that the Court's assumption parted with a number 
of cases, including Halper. ld. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 
(1989); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144 (1963); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938), stating that: 
[f1orfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of 
fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which 
have been recognized as enforceable [sic) by civil proceed-
ings since the original revenue law of 1789. In spite of 
their comparative severity, such sanctions have been up-
held against the contention that they are essentially crim-
inal and subject to the procedural rules governing crimi-
nal prosecutions. 
ld. (citation omitted). 
While acknowledging that Kennedy and Ward may appear to support the 
majority's assumption, Justice Scalia distinguished the case at bar. Kurth Ranch, 
114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). In Mendoza· 
Martinez, the Court stated the seven criteria traditionally applied to determine 
whether a particular Act of Congress is civil or criminal: 
[w)hether the sanction involves an .affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding 
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it 
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
27
Ravazzini: Drug Tax
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
358 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:331 
concluded that the civil tax proceeding criminally punished the 
Kurths, it would not only be proscribed by the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause, but by the criminal procedure protections of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments,l82 The proceeding would there-
fore be struck down whether or not it had been preceded by 
the criminal prosecution,l8S Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, 
the majority contradicted itself when it asserted both that the 
tax proceeding would be "lawful in isolation"184 and that the 
assigned are all relevant to the inquiry . . . . 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. 
The Ward Court, in determining whether an Act of Congress was civil or criminal, 
declared: 
[o)ur inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded on 
two levels. First, we have set out to determine whether 
Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indi-
cated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one 
label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated 
an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired 
further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive ei-
ther in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. In 
regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted that 'only the 
clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitution-
ality of a statute on such a ground.' 
[d. at 248-49, quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (citations 
omitted). "In making this [second) determination, . . . refer to the seven consider-
ations listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, 372 U.S., at 168-69." Ward, 
448 U.S. at 249. 
Justice Scalia noted that the criteria used in Kennedy and Ward to deter-
mine whether proceedings are civil or criminal were more stringent than the crite-
ria applied in Halper. Justice Scalia explained that Halper's retribution and deter-
rence test was just one factor in the Kennedy-Ward "criminal prosecution" test. 
Justice Scalia reasoned it was precisely the difficulty in meeting the criminal pros-
ecution test which prompted the Halper Court to turn to the multiple-punishments 
analysis. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
182. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). For instance, a criminal defendant has a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and a right to an indictment by a grand jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under 
the Sixth Amendment, the criminal defendant has the right "to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . , and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process . . . , and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
183. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia argues that if the tax proceeding was criminal in nature, it 
would require the constitutional protections afforded a defendant in criminal prose-
cutions, regardless of the order the proceeding was instituted. 
184. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia is referring to the Court's assertion that "Montana no 
doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana, for example, if it had 
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proceeding was "the functional equivalent"185 of a second 
criminal prosecution. 188 
Finally, Justice Scalia found that the Kurths were not 
subjected to a second criminal prosecution.187 Because the 
drug tax and criminal penalties were legislatively authorized, 
the tax satisfied that principle of due process mistakenly re-
ferred to as the multiple-punishments component of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.188 
V. CONCLUSION 
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch 189 marks an ex-
pansion of double jeopardy jurisprudence into civil tax proceed-
ings. In this case of first impression, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a civil tax proceeding commenced during a 
criminal prosecution for the same offense, the possession and 
storage of dangerous drugs, ran afoul of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Double Jeopardy Clause. In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
concluded that it did. 
The majority concluded that the "unusual" features of 
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act set the statute apart from 
most taxes. Specifically, the majority noted that Montana's tax 
hinged on the commission of a crime, was levied on goods the 
not previously punished the taxpayer for the same offense .... " 1d. at 1945. 
185. 1d. at 1948. 
186. 1d. at 1960. "In fact, the Court's conclusion that the Montana tax assess-
ment was the 'functional equivalent' of a criminal proceeding may sub silentio 
overrule the more stringent &nnedy-Ward test . . . for determining if a proceed-
ing is criminal." HARv. L. REv., supra note 19, at 177-78 n.53 (1994) "The 
m~ority's judicial back-pedaling into multiple-prosecutions jurisprudence suggests 
the Court may be uncomfortable with its own multiple-punishments analysis and 
is another 'characteristic signO of doctrinal senility .... 1d. at 177-78 (quoting Com-
ment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 (1965». 
187. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia came to this conclusion after applying the Kennedy-Ward 
"criminal prosecution" test to the Kurths' tax proceeding. 
188. 1d. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, this 'legislative authorization' protec-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause was originally found only in the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. 1d. at 1958-60. 
189. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (per 
Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.; dissenting 
opinions by Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, J.; and Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.). 
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taxpayer never lawfully possessed, was assessed at eight times 
the market value of the property taxed, and was partly moti-
vated by an interest in deterrence. Given these unusual char-
acteristics, the majority concluded that the tax was properly 
characterized as punishment and thus violated the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy. 
In dissent in Kurth Ranch, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued 
that the majority failed to provide a clear test for determining 
when a tax constitutes punishment in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. The Chief Justice found the factors enun-
ciated by the majority to be "a hodgepodge of criteria - many 
of which have been squarely rejected by our previous decisions 
••• "190 Justice O'Connor argued in dissent that the Halper 
proportionality analysis should apply to civil tax proceedings, 
and that under such analysis, the Montana tax should be 
viewed as remedial. Finally, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, argued in dissent that the Fifth Amendment as envi-
sioned by the Framers of the Constitution did not prohibit 
multiple punishments for the same offense, thus the Montana 
tax should have been upheld. 
Tad Ravazzini" 
190. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) . 
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